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Introduction
California Civil Code section 48a' limits recovery in defama-
tion suits against newspapers or radio broadcasters to special
damages2 unless the plaintiff has unsuccessfully demanded a
1. The full text of the statute reads as follows:
Section 48a. Libel in newspaper; slander by radio broadcast
1. Special damages; notice and demand for correction. In any action for
damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio
broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a cor-
rection be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter pro-
vided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, at the place of publication or
broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a -written notice specifying the state-
ments claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. Said
notice and demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge of the
publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.
2. General, special and exemplary damages. If a correction be demanded
within said period and be not published or broadcast in substantially as con-
spicuous a manner in said newspaper or on said broadcasting station as were
the statements claimed to be libelous, in a regular issue thereof published or
broadcast within three weeks after such service, plaintiff, if he pleads and
proves such notice, demand and failure to correct, and if his cause of action
be maintained, may recover general, special and exemplary damages; pro-
vided that no exemplary damages may be recovered unless the plaintiff shall
prove that defendant made the publication or broadcast with actual malice
and then only in the discretion of the court or jury, and actual malice shall
not be inferred or presumed from the publication or broadcast.
3. Correction prior to demand. A correction published or broadcast in
substantially as conspicuous a manner in said newspaper or on said broad-
casting station as the statements claimed in the complaint to be libelous,
prior to receipt of a demand therefor, shall be of the same force and effect as
though such correction had been published or broadcast within three weeks
after a demand therefor.
4. Definitions. As used herein, the terms "general damages," "special
damages," "exemplary damages" and "actual malice," are defined as follows:
(a) "General damages" are damages for loss of reputation, shame, mortifica-
tion and hurt feelings;
(b) "Special damages" are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that
he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occu-
pation, including such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves
he has expended as a result of the alleged libel, and no other;
(c) "Exemplary damages" are damages which may in the discretion of the
court or jury be recovered in addition to general and special damages for the
sake of example and by way of punishing a defendant who has made the
publication or broadcast with actual malice;
(d) "Actual malice" is that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will to-
ward the plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by
a good faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous
publication or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1988).
2. Special damages are those which the plaintiff pleads and proves that he has
actually suffered. Id. § 48a(4)(b).
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retraction from the media defendant.3 The effect of section 48a
is to preclude both general4 and exemplary5 damages if the req-
uisite criteria of the statute are met.
Because the term "newspaper" is not defined in the statute,
the scope of protection offered to the print media has been
delineated in a series of state court decisions.6 Although
magazines and other periodicals apparently do not qualify for
the statute's protection,' the exact breadth of the term "news-
paper" for section 48a purposes is still in dispute.
The primary purpose of section 48a is to protect media which,
by focusing on speedy dissemination of the news, may unwit-
tingly publish inaccurate information; accordingly, an impor-
tant element in determining newspaper status is a publication's
"lead time."' Lead time is defined as "the shortest period of
time between completion of an article and the time it is pub-
lished."9 In other words, a publication which reports events im-
mediately after they happen may have little or no time in
which to verify the accuracy of its stories. By ascertaining how
long a publication has between its news deadline and the time it
goes to the printer, a court can determine whether a publica-
tion in fact merits the protection offered by section 48a.
The landmark case on this issue is Burnett v. National En-
quirer, Inc.,1° designating the National Enquirer a non-news-
paper for purposes of section 48a. Burnett involved a
defamation suit brought by entertainer Carol Burnett, alleging
that an item in the Enquirer's weekly gossip column was false
3. Id. § 48a.
4. General damages compensate for loss of reputation, shame, mortification and
hurt feelings, but not for actual monetary loss. Id. § 48a(4)(a).
5. Exemplary damages are punitive damages; the statute itself limits such dam-
ages to cases involving actual malice. Id § 48a(4)(c) & (d).
6. See infra notes 72-131 and accompanying text.
7. Some confusion on the issue still remains. See, eg., infra notes 72-88 and ac-
companying text.
8. See infra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
9. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1000 n.3, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 206, 210 n.3 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
If a "deadline" is the time by which an article must be placed in the printing
process in order to be completed for distribution, by one accepted definition
"lead time" is the period from the deadline to such point of completion, or,
put another way, is the shortest period of time between completion of an
article and the time it is published.
Id
10. 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014
(1984).
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and libelous.1 ' The Enquirer claimed protection under section
48a, but both trial and appellate courts found that it was not a
newspaper and therefore fell outside the scope of the statute's
protection.12 Although both courts mentioned other factors,
each ultimately rested its decision on the loose time constraints
under which the Enquirer operated.'3
Burnett is the only reported case to analyze an assertion of
section 48a coverage by a publication which would popularly be
considered a newspaper. Unfortunately, however, the decision
does not provide a clear test of what constitutes newspaper sta-
tus under the statute.14 As a result, the precise indicia neces-
sary for section 48a newspaper status are still debated, and
extraneous factors of doubtful relevance under Burnett have
been introduced into this debate.
Kronemyer v. The Reader,'5 recently filed in San Diego
County Superior Court, provides an illustrative example. In
challenging the status of the San Diego Reader (The Reader) as
a newspaper under section 48a, the plaintiff in this defamation
suit relied on a host of factors, most of them of questionable
relevance under Burnett.16 These included the fact that The
Reader is published weekly, 7 that it subscribes to no wire serv-
ices,"' that it does not identify itself as a newspaper, 9 and that
it is distributed free of charge and derives its revenues solely
from advertising.20 Furthermore, plaintiff Kronemyer at-
tempted to argue that The Reader's content did not entitle it to
newspaper status.2 '
11. Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 208; Burnett v. National
Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321, 1321-22 (1981) (trial court opinion).
12. Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14; Burnett, 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1321, 1322.
13. Burnett, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1322; Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 193
Cal. Rptr. at 211. See infra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 92-131 and accompanying text.
15. Kronemyer v. The Reader, No. 83-498453 (S.D. Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 28,
1983), dismissed with prejudice, Dec. 7, 1987.
16. See irnfra notes 153-70 and accompanying text.
17. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defend-
ants' Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues at 9, Kronemyer v. The Reader, No.
83-498453 (S.D. Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 28, 1983), dismissed with prejudice, Dec 7,
1987 [hereinafter Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Adjudication].
This material is on file at the San Francisco Bay Guardian, 2700 19th Street, San
Francisco, CA 94110.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id
20. Id. at 9-10.
21. Id. at 9.
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Although the case was eventually settled out of court and
The Reader's status as a newspaper never adjudicated,22 the
case illustrates the potential chilling effect exerted under the
current state of the law on smaller, non-daily California print
media such as The Reader. Failure to extend the shield of sec-
tion 48a to publications such as The Reader severely limits the
statute's applicability and undermines its effectiveness. The
sound policy underpinnings of the statute, namely, encouraging
the speedy publication of news, are ill-served when publications
which do in fact quickly disseminate the news are excluded
from its coverage.2
Accordingly, this Note will argue that the shield of section
48a should extend to a broad category of media - not simply to
a limited group of traditional, daily newspapers. Section 48a
should be amended to eradicate the questionable distinction,
for purposes of the statute, between newspapers and mag-
azines. Rather, section 48a coverage should depend only on how
often a publication is regularly published. While an alternative
solution might be to base protection on a publication's lead
time, formulating an absolute maximum lead time standard
would arguably lead to even more avoidable litigation than cur-
rently occurs.
In reaching the above conclusion, this Note first discusses the
legislative history of section 48a. Second, it traces the statute's
case history, including affirmation of the statute's constitution-
ality, the scope of protection offered to newspapers and radio
broadcasts, the minimum standards for an adequate retraction,
the statute's possible use in non-defamation actions, and its ap-
plicability to non-newspaper/radio media. The next section ex-
amines California case law on the definition of "newspaper"
under section 48a. It is then argued that a chilling effect on
media has resulted from uncertainty as to this definition, and,
furthermore, that modern libel law often fails to provide plain-
tiffs with an adequate remedy. Finally, the Note proposes
amending section 48a to provide broader and more definite ap-
plicability to print media in California.
22. Conversation with Steve Kruis, Esq., of Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, Attorneys
for the Defendants (Feb. 9, 1988).
23. See infira notes 90-131 and accompanying text. While it can certainly be ar-
gued that section 48a protection should also be extended to cover television, that sub-
ject is beyond the scope of this Note.
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I
The Legislative History and Public Policy Goals
of Section 48a
As originally promulgated in 1931, California Civil Code sec-
tion 48a applied only to "newspapers. '24 Under its terms, the
plaintiff in a libel suit against a newspaper defendant could re-
cover no more than "actual damages"' unless the plaintiff had
demanded and been refused a retraction. To warrant protec-
tion, a newspaper had to show lack of malice and publish a suf-
ficient retraction within two weeks of the request therefor.2
In 1945, section 48a was revised and amended to include radio
broadcasters in addition to newspapers.27 Under the revised
statute, which remains unchanged today, plaintiffs are limited
to "special damages" 28 unless they demand and are refused a
24. 1931 Cal. Stat. 1018 (amended 1945). In its entirety, the statute read:
In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, if
the defendant can show that such libelous matter was published through mis-
information or mistake, the plaintiff shall recover no more than actual dam-
ages, unless a retraction be demanded and refused as hereinafter provided.
Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher at the place of publication a notice
specifying the statements claimed to be libelous, and requesting that the
same be withdrawn.
If a retraction or correction thereof be not published in as conspicuous a
place and type in said newspaper as were the statements complained of, in a
regular issue thereof published within two weeks after such service, plaintiff
may allege such notice, demand, and failure to retract in his complaint and
may recover both actual, special and exemplary damages if his cause of action
be maintained. If such retraction be so published, he may still recover such
actual, special, and exemplary damages, unless the defendant shall show that
the libelous publication was made in good faith, without malice, and under a
mistake as to the facts.
Id.
25. Although actual damages are not defined in the 1931 statute, a generally ac-
cepted definition is "[r]eal, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a
complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979). Actual damages are generally considered synonymous
with compensatory damages, or those damages compensating for injury actually sus-
tained, often economically. Id See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974) (defining actual damages as "only such damages as are sufficient to compensate
[the plaintiff] for actual injury").
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1988).
27. 1945 Cal. Stat. 1489 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1988)).
28. Although the 1931 Statute potentially limits plaintiffs to "actual" damages,
while the present statute refers to "special" damages, the terms are used synony-
mously. Special damages and actual damages may both be equated with compensa-
tory damages - damages for actual, economic injury, as compared to "general"
damages, which compensate for lost of reputation and other related injuries.
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"correction." Plaintiffs now have a time limit - twenty days
after "knowledge of the publication"' - within which they
must demand the correction,31 and the defendant is given three
instead of two weeks to comply.u Furthermore, defendants
need no longer show good faith error in order to qualify for the
statute's protection.33
As committee hearings and other legislative discussion of the
statute were not recorded in 1931,1 state courts have been
forced to speculate as to the original legislative intent of section
48a.1
The statute provides newspapers and radio broadcasters with
protections available neither to other media nor to private defa-
mation defendants. Its effect is to grant a modified protection
to two classes of media which typically provide timely coverage
of the news. Conversely, slower-paced media, such as mag-
azines and books, are excluded from the shield of section 48a.3
In the absence of clear legislative intent, the most significant
rationale advanced by the courts for this protection is the una-
voidable danger that some media, in quickly gathering and dis-
seminating news, will make mistakes due to their inability to
check sources for accuracy and verification prior to publication.
As the California Supreme Court stated in 1950: "In view of...
29. When the legislature amended the statute, it substituted the word "correc-
tion" for "retraction." "A 'retraction' implies that the publisher take back the origi-
nal story and say it was untrue. A 'correction' seemingly would require a correct
statement of the facts as well." Simon, LibeL" Retraction. Fffect Qf Recent California
Legislation, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 951, 960 n.52 (1950). Apparently something more than a
mere retraction is now required.
As "correction" and "retraction" are often used synonymously, and, indeed, most
subsequent California cases refer to section 48a's "retraction requirement," this Note
will use the two words interchangeably. But see Cendali, Of Things to Come - The
Actual Impact of Herbert v. Lando and a Proposed National Correction Statute, 22
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 441, 495 (1985) (arguing that "retraction" has a more antagonistic
connotation than does "correction").




34. The Archives of the Secretary of State of California has collected nineteen
pages of material referred to by the governor before signing the 1945 amendment.
However, the material, consisting primarily of letters from legislative analysts and
lobbyists, contains no information on the original statute and focuses exclusively on
the justifications for including radio broadcasters within the statute's coverage. This
material is on file at COMM/ENT, Hastings College of the Law, 200 McAllister, San
Francisco, CA 94102.
35. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 66-88 and accompanying text.
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the necessity of publishing news while it is new, newspapers
and radio stations may in good faith publicize items that are
untrue but whose falsity they have neither the time nor the
opportunity to ascertain.""7
Almost twenty years later, the California Supreme Court
succinctly restated its position as to legislative intent, although
without hurried reporting of the news as an explicit rationale:
"The Legislature enacted Civil Code section 48a to encourage a
more active press by means of an increased insulation of news-
papers from liability arising from erroneous published state-
ments."' ,s
In addition to suggesting legislative intent to minimize gener-
ally the chilling effect on the press of libel suits, the California
Supreme Court has noted specific public policies furthered by
the precise limitations of section 48a.39 The legislature may
simply have decided that "defamation suits against newspapers
and radio stations constituted the most conspicuous example of
the danger it sought to preclude. '40 It may have concluded that,
"because of the business they are engaged in, newspapers and
radio stations are the most frequent objects of defamation ac-
tions,"41 and, furthermore, "that the danger of excessive dam-
ages in actions against them is greatest because of their reputed
ability to pay.''42 Also, in considering the sufficiency of the
remedy being granted, the legislature may have "take[n] into
consideration the fact that a retraction widely circulated by a
newspaper or radio station would have greater effectiveness
than a retraction by an individual. '43
37. Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 128, 216 P.2d 825,
830 (1950). See also Simon, supra note 29, at 953 ("Newspapers must print news while
it is fresh, and unavoidable mistakes may be justified in the interest of a free and
prompt press.") (referring to International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 235 (1918)).
38. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 459 P.2d 912, 917, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365
(1969). See also Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., 153 Cal. App. 3d 574, 581,
200 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538-39 (1984).
39. Werner, 35 Cal. 2d at 121, 216 P.2d at 825.
40. Id. at 132, 216 P.2d at 832.








Section 48a was found to meet both federal and state consti-
tutional standards in Werner v. Southern California Associated
Newspapers." In addressing appellant's equal protection claim
in that case, the court examined a number of rationales on
which the legislature could reasonably have relied in circum-
scribing the scope of the statute as it did. The court found that
classifying newspapers and radio stations apart from other me-
dia bore a reasonable relationship to the objectives the legisla-
ture sought to further in enacting section 48a, namely, limiting
excessive defamation suits against those particular media.45
Those groups could be singled out, the court held, because
"newspapers and radio stations constituted the most conspicu-
ous example of the danger [of excessive suits]."
According to the court, the Legislature could reasonably
have concluded that "because of the business they are engaged
in, newspapers and radio stations are the most frequent objects
of defamation actions and.., the danger of excessive damages
in actions against them is greatest because of their reputed abil-
ity to pay."47 Further, in balancing protection of defendants
with ensuring plaintiffs an adequate remedy, "the Legislature
could properly take into consideration the fact that a retraction
widely circulated by a newspaper or radio station would have
44. 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950). A subsequent constitutional challenge in
federal court was summarily disposed of, with the court citing Werner v. Southern
CaL Assoc. Newspapers and stating that there was no controlling federal law which
would dictate a contrary conclusion. Werner v. Hearst Publishing, 297 F.2d 145,148-49(9th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, see
Tepper, Libel and Slander: Mitigation of Damages - Constitutionality and Scope of
Newspaper Libel Retraction Statute, 2 HASTINGS L.J. 75 (1951); Simon, supra note 29,
at 954. For a strong critique of the Werner decision, see Newell & Pickerell, Califor-
nia's Retraction Statute: License to Libel?, 28 JOURNALISM Q. 474 (1951). For a com-
parison of the 1931 and 1945 versions of the statute, as well as their constitutionality,
see Comment, Libel and Slander, 19 S. CAL. L. REv. 119, 124-26 (1945).
It should be noted that right-to-reply statutes, giving plaintiffs a statutory right to a
retraction instead of merely providing special privileges for defendants who volunta-
lily retract, have been held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). For a discussion of
whether the Court's holding could be construed to apply to all retraction statutes, see
Cendali, supra note 29, at 493-94.
45. Id. at 132, 216 P.2d at 832.
46. Id
47. Id. at 133, 216 P.2d at 833.
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greater effectiveness than a retraction by an individual. 48
The court noted that, despite the statute's protection ex-
tending even "to those who may deliberately and maliciously
disseminate libels, the Legislature could reasonably conclude
that it was necessary to go so far [to] effectively ... protect
those who in good faith and without malice inadvertently pub-
lish defamatory statements."49
In concurrently holding that section 48a did not violate the
plaintiff's due process rights by depriving him of damages, the
court found that due process does not preclude legislative aboli-
tion of common law rights, so long as the ultimate objective is a
permissible legislative goal.50 The court stated that there ex-
isted at least two legitimate bases for the statute: "the danger of
excessive recoveries of general damages in libel actions and the
public interest in the free dissemination of news. "51
B. The Sufficiency of a Retraction Demand under Section 48a
Once the constitutionality of section 48a was established, the
statute's various limitations and requirements were gradually
delineated by the courts. One of the first issues litigated was
the standards a prospective plaintiff must meet in making a re-
traction demand under the statute.52
In Larr'ick v. illoon,53 the court narrowly read the statute as
requiring that demand be made on the publisher, whether or
not the plaintiff named him as a defendant. The court reasoned
that, "Reporters, columnists, authors, critics, editors, and the
48. Id.
49. I at 134, 216 P.2d at 833.
50. Werner, 35 Cal. 2d at 125-26, 216 P.2d at 828. For a discussion of this holding,
see Simon, supra note 29, at 956-57.
But cf e.g., Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 730 P.2d 186 (1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1954 (1987) (holding Arizona's retraction statute unconstitu-
tional under the state constitution's "open court" guarantee insofar as it precluded
general damages where a media defendant had published a retraction).
51. Werner, 35 Cal. 2d at 126, 216 P.2d at 828.
52. The relevant portion of section 48a states:
Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, at the place of publication or broad-
caster at the place of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements
claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. Said notice
and demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge of the publica-
tion or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1988).
53. 176 Cal. App. 2d 408, 1 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1959). There, a libel defendant whose
statements had been published in various newspapers claimed that a retraction de-
mand should have been served on him, and not on the various publishers. Id.
RETRACTION STATUTE
publisher are all participants in newspaper publications. When
error is made, however, it is the publisher who has power to
make correction."' '
In Kapellas v. Kofman,- the California Supreme Court fur-
ther delineated the requirements of an effective retraction de-
mand. Finding that the retraction requirement "did not intend
to build technical barricades to recovery,"m the court stated
that the sufficiency of a retraction demand "turns on whether
the publisher should reasonably have comprehended which
statements plaintiff protested and wished corrected."5 7
Finally, in Di Giorgio Corp. v. Valley Labor Citizen,' the
plaintiff's duty in the case of numerous republications was con-
sidered. An appellate court concluded that, where a defend-
ant's article is published in several newspapers without his
authorization or consent, to qualify under section 48a a plaintiff
must serve a retraction on the publisher of each publication.59
C. The Scope of Protection Offered by Section 48a, within the
Context of Newspaper and Radio
Although section 48a requires that a demand for correction
be served "upon the publisher.., or broadcaster,"' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has extended the statutory shield to cover
others involved in the disseminating process.6 ' According to the
court, "It does not follow ... that because the person upon
whom the notice to retract must be served is the publisher of
the newspaper, the statute applies to him alone. Reporters, col-
umnists, authors, critics, editors, and the publisher are all par-
ticipants in newspaper publications.' e
Courts have limited the statute's coverage, however, to those
actually engaged in the business of disseminating news. For ex-
ample, it has been held the statute does not shield a person who
54. 1d at 421, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69 (citing Pridonoff v. Balokovich, 36 Cal. 2d 788,
791, 228 P.2d 6, 8 (1951)). See also Farr v. Bramblett, 132 Cal. App. 2d 36, 44, 281 P.2d
372, 377-78 (1955).
55. 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
56. Id. at 31, 459 P.2d at 918, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
57. I& (citing MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 554, 343 P.2d 36,
46 (1959)).
58. 260 Cal. App. 2d 268, 67 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1968).
59. Id. at 274-75, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 87-88.
60. CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1988).
61. See Field Research Corp. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 110, 453 P.2d 747,77 Cal.
Rptr. 243 (1969); Pridonoff v. Balokovich, 36 Cal. 2d 788, 228 P.2d 6 (1951).
62. Prdonoff, 36 Cal. 2d at 791, 228 P.2d at 8.
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makes a libelous statement to a reporter, even if the statement
is eventually published in a newspaper.6 3 Neither does it pro-
tect individuals holding press conferences." In justifying the
restrictive application of section 48a, the California Supreme
Court stated:
There is a significant difference... between one who occasion-
ally discovers and makes public an item that is newsworthy.
and one who, as a daily occupation or business, collects, col-
lates, evaluates, reduces to communicable form, and communi-
cates the news. It is these latter activities that the Legislature
sought to protect through section 48a.65
D. The Applicability of Section 48a in Non-Defamation Cases
False light and defamation actions are, in substance, approxi-
mately equivalent,6 and in fact often overlap. 7 However, plain-
tiffs may not evade the requirements of section 48a by alleging
false light instead of defamation, as California courts have held
that a false light claim must fulfill the requirements of section
48a, including its notice and demand provisions.s
Invasion of privacy suits, however, are not subject to section
48a.69 Because such actions rest not on the inaccuracy of a
statement, but on the violation of a plaintiff's privacy," a re-
63. Mercado v. Hoefler, 190 Cal. App. 2d 12, 18, 11 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790-91 (1961).
64. Field Research Corp., 71 Cal. 2d at 114 n.4, 453 P.2d at 750 n.4, 77 Cal. Rptr. at
246 n.4 (disapproving, to the extent they would "extend the application of Section 48a
to non-participants in publishing and broadcasting enterprises," Larrick v. Gilloon,
176 Cal. App. 2d 408, 1 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1959) (applying section 48a to press releases and
political advertisements); Farr v. Bramblett, 132 Cal. App. 2d 36, 281 P.2d 372 (1955)
(holding that section 48a applies to advertisements); and Howard v. Southern Cal.
Assoc. Newspapers, 95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 213 P.2d 399 (1950)).
65. Field Research Corp., 71 Cal. 2d at 115-16, 453 P.2d at 751, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
66. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMUNICATIONS LAw 59 (1986). False light is a
somewhat broader tort and such a claim may succeed where a defamation one would
not. It is primarily intended to redress injury to feelings, whereas defamation is in-
tended to compensate for damage to reputation. Id.
67. See Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 120, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208,
214 (1961).
68. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 543, 483 P.2d 34, 44, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 876 (1971); Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 35 n.16, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16,
81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369 n.16 (1969); Selleck v. Globe Int'l, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1134, 212
Cal. Rptr. 838, 845-46 (1985); Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal.
App. 3d 880, 893-94, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 380-81 (1974). See also Montandon v. Triangle
Publications, 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 951, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 194 (1975); Grimes v. Carter,
241 Cal. App. 2d 694, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1966); Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal.
App. 2d 111, 120-123, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 214-16 (1961).
69. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
70. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
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traction would serve only to exacerbate his injury by repeating
the publication.71
E. The Applicability of Section 48a to Magazines
The most thoughtful analysis to date of the applicability of
section 48a to magazines appears in Montandon v. Triangle
Publications, a 1975 appellate court case.72 In holding that the
statute did not apply to magazines, the court cited numerous
precedents,73 but was also forced to explain a four-year-old Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decision which implied that the statute
did apply.74 In that case, Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association,
the California Supreme Court had dismissed a false light action
on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to comply with the no-
tice and demand requirements of section 48a.
However, as noted in Montandon, the opinion in Briscoe con-
tained no discussion of the status of Reader's Digest as a maga-
zine, and offered no basis for the finding that it was protected.76
Furthermore, despite the fact that lower courts had routinely
held that the statute did not 'apply to magazines,77 the Briscoe
court failed to discuss those prior cases.78 In Werner v. South-
71. Kapellas, 1 Cal. 3d at 35, 459 P.2d at 921-22, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70. See also idE
at n.17 (approving the holding of Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14
Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961), which applied section 48a to a false light claim, but disapproving
any dicta "intimating that all privacy actions against newspapers are subject to Sec-
tion 48a").
72. 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1975). There has also been occasional
litigation concerning the statute's applicability to books and television. In 1965, an
appellate court implied that section 48a would apply to television, but the case was
dismissed on other grounds, as the defendant was an intruder on the TV show and not
a legitimate disseminator of news. White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 241 (1965). In 1974, after deciding the case on statute of limitation grounds, an
appellate court specifically declined to determine whether the statute applies to
books. Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 370 (1974).
73. Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 949-53, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 193-96. See infra notes
79-85 and accompanying text.
74. Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 951-52, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95 (referring to
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 543, 483 P.2d 34, 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866,
876 (1971)).
75. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
76. Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
77. Id. at 951-53, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 194-96. See infna notes 79-85 and accompanying
text.
78. The two cases which were cited in Briscoe in connection with this issue both
concerned newspapers. See Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 360 (1969); Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 108, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208
(1961).
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ern California Associated Newspapers, for example, the court,
addressing a purported due process violation, had upheld "the
classification of newspapers and radio stations apart from
others."7 9 Furthermore, Morris v. National Federation of the
Blind,80 the first California case to specifically address the is-
sue, held that section 48a did not apply to magazines."1 The
court stated:
On full review of the statute, we conclude that it applies only
to a publication in a newspaper or by radio. Its terms are clear.
The Legislature conspicuously failed to include magazines in
the protected group. We are bound by this apparently in-
tended omission. Extension of the statute requires amend-
ment rather than interpretation.8 2
The Morris court also noted that "the exculpatory effect of a
retraction is limited to one published within three weeks of de-
mand therefor, a requirement which would often be impossible
of fulfillment by a magazine published monthly." s If applied
to magazines, therefore, the statute would discriminate against
those not published often enough to comply with the retraction
time limits.84 Lending additional credibility to the holding in
Morris, the court in Montandon pointed out that the legislature
had never amended section 48a to include magazines, leading
one to believe that magazines are intentionally excluded under
the statute.85
In light of the holding in Morris, the criticism in Montandon
of Briscoe, and the fact that the California Supreme Court has
declined to review Montandon,86 subsequent lower courts,
although without explicitly addressing the issue, have tended to
assume the exclusion of magazines from section 48a.8 7 In addi-
79. 35 Cal. 2d 121, 132, 216 P.2d 825, 832 (1950).
80. 192 Cal. App. 2d 162, 13 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1961).
81. Id. at 165-66, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
82. I& at 166, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
83. Id. at 165-66, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
84. Id. See also Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (a statute
"which completely ignores all magazines could not be construed to apply to certain
magazines and not to others").
85. Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 952, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
86. See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
87. See, e.g., Selleck v. Globe Int'l, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1134 n.7, 212 Cal. Rptr.
838, 846 n.7 (1985) ("Inasmuch as defendant's publication ... allegedly is a weekly
magazine, not a newspaper, plaintiff was not required to plead compliance with the
requirements of Section 48a."); Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d
121, 129-30, 293 P.2d 531, 537-38 (1956) (assuming that, once plaintiff had conceded its
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tion, Montandon was cited with approval by a 1975 federal ap-
pellate court, which concluded that the California Supreme
Court, were it to address the issue again, would hold that sec-
tion 48a does not apply to magazines."
III
Case Law on the Definition of a "Newspaper"
for Purposes of Section 48a: Burnett v.
National Enquirer, Inc.
For purposes of section 48a, whether or not a publication is a
newspaper is a question of law.89 In Montandon, the court dis-
missed the defendant's contention that it was for a jury to de-
termine, as a matter of fact, whether TV Guide is a magazine or
a newspaper. Rather, the court stated, "[t]hat determination is
one of law to be made by the court."9
Several California courts have described section 48a's under-
lying purpose as the providing of special protection to those en-
gaged in "publishing news while it is new."' However, the only
case to actually establish legal standards for defining a newspa-
per under the statute is Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc.,92
holding that the National Enquirer (Enquirer) is not a section
48a "newspaper. ' 93
Burnett involved a libel suit by actress/comedienne Carol
magazine status, it was precluded from the protection of section 48a). But see Harris
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (1942) (a very early case
which assumed inclusion of magazines without discussion, as the issue was apparently
not raised by the parties).
88. Alioto, 519 F.2d at 779. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
423 U.S. 930 (1975). See also Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991,
1002-04, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 212-13 (1983) (citing both Montandon and Morris v. Na-
tional Federation of the Blind with approval in dismissing defendant's claim under
the holding of Briscoe).
89. Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 953, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 195-96. But see Shumate
v. Johnson Publishing Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d 121, 293 P.2d 531 (1956). The question of
whether Jet was a newspaper was tried as a question of fact; however, the defendant
had tried the case on this theory, without objection by the plaintiff, and the appellate
court disallowed defendant's subsequent motion to reverse on the theory that the is-
sue was one of law. The court simply stated, 'The theory on which the case was tried
in the court below must be followed on review." Id at 130, 293 P.2d at 538.
90. Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 953, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 195-96.
91. Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 128, 216 P.2d 825,
830 (1950).
92. 144 Cal. App. 3d 991,193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014
(1984).
93. Id. at 999-1005, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210-14.
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Burnett against the National Enquirer, a weekly publication,
concerning an item in the Enquirer's gossip column. The piece,
entitled "Carol Burnett and Henry K. in Row," described Bur-
nett's allegedly "boisterous" behavior in a Washington, D.C.
restaurant.94 At Burnett's request, the Enquirer eventually
printed a retraction.95 However, Burnett maintained that the
retraction was insufficient, and that in any case the Enquirer
was not a newspaper and therefore was not protected by section
48a . 6
In addressing whether the Enquirer in fact qualified as a
newspaper under section 48a, the court first examined the pub-
lication's own self-classification, as well as that of outside par-
ties. The court noted that the Enquirer was a member of the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, that its insurance
applications and county assessor filings described it as a news-
paper, that both the U.S. Department of Labor and a state reve-
nue department had labelled it a newspaper, and that its
masthead claimed the "Largest Circulation Of Any Paper in
America."" The court further noted, however, that the En-
quirer was designated as a magazine or periodical in eight mass
media directories, and that it had itself previously requested
the Audit Bureau of Circulation to change its classification
from newspaper to magazine.9
The court noted in passing that the Enquirer's 1960 request
to the Audit Bureau was based on its general manager's written
representation that its "feature content and general appearance
94. The column stated:
At a Washington restaurant, a boisterous Carol Burnett had a loud argument
with another diner, Henry Kissinger. Then she traipsed around the place
offering everyone a bite of her dessert. But Carol really raised eyebrows
when she accidentally knocked a glass of water over one diner - and started
giggling instead of apologizing. The guy wasn't amused and "accidentally"
spilled a glass of water over Carol's dress.
National Enquirer, March 2, 1976, at 12, col. 4.
95. The retraction, also printed in the Enquirer's gossip column, stated:
An item in this column on March 2 erroneously reported that Carol Burnett
had an argument with Henry Kissinger at a Washington restaurant and be-
came boisterous, disturbing other guests. We understand these events did
not occur and we are sorry for any embarrassment our report may have
caused Miss Burnett.
Id., April 13, 1976, at 12, col. 4.
96. 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 997, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (1983). See also R. SMOLLA,
SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA AND POWER 108-09 (1986).




... differ markedly from those of a newspaper." It further
commented that, although the newspaper subscribed to the
Reuters News Service,1°° it did not subscribe to the Associated
Press or United Press International news services 01 The court
also noted that the Enquirer's staff "call themselves newspaper
reporters."'102
The court continued with a general description of the publi-
cation's content:
According to a statement by its Senior Editor it is not a news-
paper and its content is based on a consistent formula of "how
to" stories, celebrity or medical or personal improvement sto-
ries, gossip items and TV column items, together with material
from certain other subjects. It provides little or no current
coverage of subjects such as politics, sports or crime, does not
attribute content to wire services, and in general does not
make reference to time. 03
Finally, in a brief two sentences, the court addressed the En-
quirer's failure to routinely disseminate news quickly: "Normal
'lead time""°4 for its subject matter is one to three weeks.10 5 Its
owner allowed it did not generate stories 'day to day as a daily
newspaper does.' ",~
As noted by the appellate court, the trial court0 7 focused on
the Enquirer's loose time restrictions in concluding that it was
not a newspaper.1 08 Although the trial court took into account
99. I& at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210. It is unclear whether the court intended a
publication's "general appearance" to be independently relevant, or whether it consid-
ered this merely as additional evidence of the Enquirer's own self-designation. On the
relevance of self-classification, see also Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 953, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 195-96 ("As the publication calls itself a magazine and its regional manager
for Northern California testified that it called itself America's Television Magazine,
the [trial] court did not err in making the determination that it is a magazine .....
100. Burnet, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 999, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
101. Id at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
102. I at 999, 193 Cal. Rptr at 210.
103. Id at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
104. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for Burnett's definition of "lead
time."
105. "Conventional newspapers, on the other hand, generate many stories on a
day-to-day basis, and often measure lead times for articles in terms of hours, rather
than weeks or days." R. SMOLLA, supra note 96, at 109-10.
106. Burnet 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (footnote omitted).
107. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (1981) (trial court
opinion).
108. The appellate court capsulized the lower court's analysis as follows:
[While [the court] took into account the indicia relating to status detailed
above, it relied upon the most fundamental of those considerations which
have been deemed sufficient to justify the designation of that particular class
1988]
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the Enquirer's status within the publishing industry, it based
its holding on the undisputed fact that timeliness was not an
integral constraint on its publication process."
Insofar as the appellate court took notice of the Enquirer's
content and news-gathering procedures, as articulated by the
trial court, it did so only to the extent that such factors dimin-
ished time constraints. 10 The appellate court clearly felt that
content "based on a consistent formula of 'how to' stories, ce-
lebrity or medical or personal improvement stories, gossip
items and TV column items, [with] little or no current coverage
of subjects such as politics, sports or crime," does not necessi-
tate publishing of "news while it is new.""' Such content ex-
plains the Enquirer's admission that it "did not generate stories
'day to day as a daily newspaper does;' "112 it also accounts for
the Enquirer's "[n]ormal lead time [of] one to three weeks.""11
3
There is a crucial distinction, however, between analyzing con-
tent for its own sake and taking note of it as an indicator of the
kind of deadlines a publication normally operates under;
clearly, the court in Burnett was doing the latter."
14
Accordingly, as the court did not consider content in and of
itself to be a criterion for section 48a coverage,"15 the fact that
the Enquirer "does not attribute content to wire services""16
was evidently not used as an indication of the class of news coy-
as the beneficiary of the protection afforded by the statute, namely, that
newspapers by virtue of the manner in which they are obliged to operate are
not generally in a position adequately to guard against the publication of ma-
terial which is untrue, such that: "In view of the complex and far-flung activ-
ities of the news services upon which newspapers and radio stations must
largely rely and the necessity of publishing news while it is new, newspapers
and radio stations may in good faith publicize items that are untrue but
whose falsity they have neither the time nor the opportunity to ascertain."
Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (citing Werner v. Southern Cal.
Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 128, 216 P.2d 825, 830 (1950)).
109. Burnet, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1322. See Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1001,
193 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
110. Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
111. Id. (citing Werner, 35 Cal. 2d at 128, 216 P.2d at 830; Burnett, 7 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) at 1322).
112. Id, (quoting the owner of the National Enquirer).
113. Id.
114. While the court in Burnett focused on content only as an indicator of the En-
quirer's lead time, the plaintiff in Kronemyer v. The Reader, for example, apparently
alleged that certain kinds of news should per se not qualify for section 48a protection.
See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Adjudication, supra note 17,
at 9-11. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
116. Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
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ered. Rather, it was considered relevant only insofar as it
demonstrated a lack of dependence on "the complex and far-
flung activities of the news services upon which newspapers
and radio stations must largely rely."117 A newspaper under
time pressure may find itself unable to adequately verify infor-
mation received from such sources,118 thereby demonstrating a
twofold justification for protection under section 48a.119
The appellate court concluded that the trial court had cor-
rectly focused "on the element of time as that element was re-
lated to appellant's publication process,"'2 ° and that section 48a
newspaper status should be found only where the constraints of
time associated with production determine the final content of
the publication.' 21 The stated reason for the Enquirer failing to
merit preferred status under section 48a, then, was the element
of time - not content, not appearance, not failure to utilize
wire services, not self-designation or classification by others as
a magazine.
The style and content of the Enquirer, however, probably in-
fluenced both the outcome of the case and the public's accept-
ance of the final decision. Although the court ultimately
appeared to rely only on the time factor, it actually devoted
much more space to other possible determinants than it did to
time.m22 According to some commentators, the court in fact fo-
cused on the Enquirer's content. Professor Rodney Smolla, for
example, charges that the court's distinction between newspa-
pers and magazines was "a thin rationalization masking what
was in fact open judicial antagonism for the Enquirer and its
failure to print real news.'1 23 "[O]ne gets the feeling," he
states, "[that the National Enquirer] is a second-class First
Amendment citizen, unworthy of the special legal treatment
afforded 'serious' news outlets."'124 This view has been reiter-
ated by others, notably Journalism Professor Ben Cunning-
117. Id at 1001, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
118. A publication can most likely more easily verify its own stories than those
taken directly from, or based on information from, an outside wire service which
gathered the information in a distant locale.
119. Not only would such a publication be operating under the time pressures
which mitigate error, but such error would not even be of its own doing.
120. Burnet4 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
121. Id at 1004, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
122. See id at 999-1001, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
123. R. SMOLLA, supra note 96, at 109-11.
124. Id The text of the trial court opinion, in particular, supports this view. See
Burnett 7 Media L Rep. (BNA) at 1322.
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ham, an expert witness for the Enquirer during the trial: "The
judge had contempt for the National Enquirer, and I think
that's what we saw in the ruling."'125 Cunningham suggests that
the Enquirer's questionable reputation may have deterred Cali-
fornia's major newspapers and journalistic organizations from
concerning themselves with the case or its outcome. 26
Whatever the true rationale for the holding of Burnett, the
precedent we are left with is confined to the written opinion of
the appellate court. Although the case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, review was denied on jurisdic-
tional grounds.12' Based on Burnett, the rule appears to be that
section 48a protection will depend on the time constraints
under which a publication operates.2'z But Burnett provides no
bright line as to exactly how burdensome those time con-
straints must be - in other words, how short a lead time a pub-
lication must have to qualify for newspaper status. Much more
troubling, however, are the numerous other factors discussed in
Burnett. '9 While the court apparently did not regard indicia
other than time constraints as relevant in themselves, their
presence in the decision is nevertheless an enticement to defa-
mation plaintiffs to use them.130
While Burnett failed to establish a clear test for determining
section 48a newspaper status, it represents the only reported
attempt by a California court to develop such a standard.131 As
no court has subsequently applied Burnett to a similar case,
Burnett's test for newspaper status under section 48a remains
unclarified.
IV
Problems Arising from the Current
State of the Law
A. The Chilling Effect of Uncertainty: Kronemyer v. The Reader
The failure of section 48a to define what constitutes a "news-
paper" forces us to rely on California case law; however, the
125. San Francisco Bay Guardian, Nov. 26, 1986, at 7, col. 3.
126. Id at 8, col. 3.
127. 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
128. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 154-70 and accompanying text.
131. See Redmond, The New Assault on the Weekly Press, San Francisco Bay
Guardian, Nov. 26, 1986, at 7, col. 3.
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cases offer no definitive standard and leave uncertain the pre-
cise scope of section 48a.
Case law pertaining to the scope of section 48a is inconclu-
sive, both as to "magazines" and as to "newspapers." While it
appeared, until 1971, that magazines were not shielded by sec-
tion 48a, in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association the California
Supreme Court in fact applied the statute to what would popu-
larly be considered a magazine. 2 Although there is general
agreement today, under Morris v. National Federation of the
Blind 1- and its progeny, that magazines are not shielded by the
statute, 1 4 Briscoe has never been explicitly overruled.
A state of confusion also exists as to newspapers. While
newspapers clearly are covered under the statute, what actu-
ally constitutes a "newspaper" is unclear. Burnett v. National
Enquirer, Inc.,' while ostensibly setting forth a publication's
time constraints as determinative of newspaper status, unfortu-
nately includes a lengthy discussion of other factors, including
content. 36 As a result, subsequent debate may well be diverted
by such tangential factors as content and self-designation, at
the expense of focusing exclusively on a publication's time
constraints.
This is precisely what occurred in a recent California libel
case, Kronemyer v. The Reader.3 7 Plaintiff David Kronemyer
sued the San Diego Reader over a story which accused him of
unethical and illegal conduct as an attorney in a multi-million-
dollar probate case."~ Despite The Reader's subsequent partial
132. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971).
133. 192 Cal. App. 162, 13 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1961).
134. See supra notes 66-88 and accompanying text.
135. 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014
(1984).
136. See supra notes 97-131.
137. No. 83-498453 (S.D. Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 1983), dismissed with prejudice,
Dec. 7, 1987.
138. The story, entitled "Baily's Million," stated that the district attorney's office
had been investigating allegations that the late millionaire Joshua T. Baily's attor-
neys, "the father/son team of Robert and David Kronemyer, had embezzled $645,000
from the Baily estate and written themselves into the Baily will for p share of the
remaining $425,000." According to the column, criminal charges were being consid-
ered. Furthermore, the article stated that "a local attorney will soon file a lawsuit
alleging that [the Kronemyers] misappropriated $114,000 from the estate of Helen
Thomas, a San Diegan who willed her estate to nine elderly nursing home patients."
San Diego Reader, April 15, 1982, at 2, col. 5. See also San Francisco Bay Guardian,
Nov. 26, 1986, at 7, col. 1.
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retraction and correction, printed one week later,139 David
Kronemyer filed suit against The Reader. 40 His complaint de-
clared that, "[o]n the unproven hypothesis that 'The Reader'
was a newspaper," he had served on the defendant a retraction
demand.' 41 However, the ensuing correction was allegedly not
published "in substantially as conspicuous a manner" as the
original column,'4 and furthermore "failed to retract and
correct all of the matters which the plaintiff had pointed out
were false and libelous in his [retraction demand] letter.' '4 3
Kronemyer therefore claimed damages for libel, slander and
invasion of privacy.'" In response, The Reader moved for sum-
mary adjudication of two issues: that it was a newspaper and
that the correction had been adequate. 45
To support its assertion of newspaper status under the stat-
ute, The Reader outlined the policies underlying section 48a'"
and the criteria enumerated in Burnett. 147 The Reader argued
that, unlike the Enquirer, under those standards it was clearly
139. The correction read as follows:
CORRECTION
In an article published last week .... David Kronemyer was incorrectly
reported to be an attorney for the late Joshua L. Baily and author of Baily's
will. Though he is listed as an "alternate executor" of the Baily will, David
Kronemyer was not named as a beneficiary in the Baily will, nor is he under
investigation for allegedly embezzling any portion of the Baily estate. The
Reader regrets these errors.
San Diego Reader, April 22, 1982, at 3, col. 5.
140. Kronemyer v. The Reader, No. 83-498453 (S.D. Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 1983),
dismissed with prejudice, Dec. 7, 1987.
141. Plaintiff's Complaint at 6, Kronemyer v. The Reader, No. 83-498453 (S.D. Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Jan. 28, 1983), dismissed with prejudice, Dec. 7, 1987. This material is
on file at the San Francisco Bay Guardian, 2700 19th Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.
142. Id See CAL. CiV. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1988).
143. Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 141, at 6-7.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Adjudication of Issues, Kronemyer v. The Reader, No. 83-498453 (S.D. Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Jan. 28, 1983), dismissed with prejudice, Dec. 7, 1987 [hereinafter De-
fendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Adjudication]. This material is on
file at the San Francisco Bay Guardian, 2700 19th Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.
Under Montandon v. Triangle Publications, 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1975), The Reader maintained, such an adjudication is one of law for the court to
decide. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Adjudication, supra,
at 11-12. See also infra note 171 and accompanying text.
146. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Adjudication, supra note
145, at 12.
147. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Adjudication, supra note
145, at 12-14. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
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a newspaper. 14
In support of its standing as a newspaper, The Reader focused
on its very short lead time - a matter of hours for some parts
of the paper, including the section containing the allegedly
defamatory material at issue here.149 The Reader also noted
that it publishes stories of a timely nature, including current
coverage of political topics and entertainment events,"5 and
presented evidence of the many stories on which it had
"scooped" other papers because of its speedy publication of
breaking stories.15 Finally, The Reader pointed out that within
the publishing industry it is widely perceived as a newspaper in
the same sense of the word as are the major dailies. 152
In response to The Reader's motion for summary adjudica-
tion, Kronemyer submitted that, under Burnett, The Reader
was not a newspaper for section 48a purposes, and, further-
more, that the published correction was inadequate under the
statute. 1 He based the former claim on several alleged charac-
teristics of The Reader, some of them of questionable relevance
under Burnett.
First, he argued that The Reader does not engage in the im-
mediate dissemination of "hot" or time-sensitive news, but that
it consists "primarily of feature articles, advice columns, letters
to the editor, entertainment and restaurant reviews and classi-
fied ads.' 154 However, Burnett considered content relevant
only to the extent that it influences the time constraints under
which a publication operates.'5 As was subsequently stated by
the defendant, "A publication may be serious, witty, porno-
graphic, muckracking [sic], etc. None of this matters except in-
sofar as the style or format of the publication may factor into
148. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Adjudication, supra note
145, at 14-17.
149. Id. at 8-9, 16-17. The publication at the root of the litigation was an item in
The Reader's weekly "City Lights" column. Id. at 4. "Feature Stories" was the section
of the paper with the longest lead time - between 48 and 72 hours. Id. at 8-9.
150. Id. at 14-15.
151. Id. at 15-17 and appended summary chart.
152. Id. at 17 (referring to declarations to that effect by editors from the San Diego
Tribune, San Diego Union and Los Angeles Times).
153. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Adjudication, supra note
17, at 1, 8.
154. Id. at 9. Although recognizing that content in and of itself was not relevant
under Burnet The Reader nevertheless presented evidence of its routine, sometimes
exclusive, coverage of current news events. Defendant's Motion for Summary Adju-
dication, supra note 145, at 4-7 and appended summary chart.
155. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
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the publication's production process." '' I
Plaintiff Kronemyer also noted that The Reader is published
weekly, that it subscribes to no wire services, and that it does
not "identify itself as a newspaper.' 1 57 However, these factors
are also not determinative under Burnett. Although the Na-
tional Enquirer happened to be a weekly, the Burnett decision
is not based on this fact, but rather on the Enquirer's lead
time.:'1 Lead time varies widely among weeklies; for example,
while the Enquirer's lead time ranged from one to three
weeks,15 9 The Reader's varied from a few hours to three days,
depending on the section of the paper.16'
As for the pertinence of a wire service subscription, this too
was considered by the Burnett court only insofar as it affected
time constraints.'' Subscription to a wire service, with its re-
sulting reliance on outside sources, combined with time pres-
sures, could well force a paper to publish without thoroughly
verifying all its facts, thereby justifying protection under sec-
tion 48a.'6 2 However, in itself, subscription to a wire service is
not a determinant factor; in fact, the Enquirer did subscribe to
one. 63 Clearly, a wire service requirement would discriminate
against local newspapers, which have no use for wire service
material - a discrimination which it has never been suggested
section 48a was intended to foster.16
That The Reader "does not identify itself as a newspaper"'165
is also not a deciding factor under Burnett. Although the Bur-
nett court summarized the Enquirer's labeling both as a news-
paper and a non-newspaper, in its final determination it
disregarded such categorizations, whether by the Enquirer or
156. Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Rebuttal to Plaintiff's
Opposition to Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues at 7, Kronemyer v. The
Reader, No. 83-498453 (S.D. Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 28, 1983), dismissed with preju-
dice, Dec. 7, 1987 [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum in Rebuttal]. This material
is on file at the San Francisco Bay Guardian, 2700 19th Street, San Francisco, CA
94110.
157. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Adjudication, supra note
17, at 10.
158. See supra notes 9 and 104-21 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
160. Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication, supra note 145, at 8-9.
161. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 110 and infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.




Finally, plaintiff Kronemyer argued that because The Reader
is distributed free of charge and derives its revenues solely
from advertising, its editorial content is incidental to the pri-
mary function of serving as a vehicle for advertising. 1 7 Accord-
ing to plaintiff's brief, under Burnett, The Reader therefore did
not qualify as a newspaper.l1s However, no such rule can be
derived from Burnett"6 9 Furthermore, plaintiff's argument
overlooked the fact that all newspapers generate at least part
of their income in a manner similar to The Reader.170
On December 10, 1986, The Reader's motion for summary ad-
judication of its status as a newspaper was denied without prej-
udice, the judge ruling only that there was a "triable issue of
fact" as to the question of newspaper status which could not be
summarily dismissed.'7 ' While the case was eventually settled
out of court and The Reader's status as a newspaper under sec-
tion 48a never judicially determined,172 the experience was
clearly a protracted, expensive and undesirable one for The
Reader.173
In contrast, The Reader's experience as a media defamation
166. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
167. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Adjudication, supra note
17, at 9-10.
168. Id. at 9.
169. As the Enquirer is not free, the court in Burnett did not even discuss the
relevance of such a factor. See Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
170. See Defendants' Memorandum in Rebuttal, supra note 156, at 19-20.
171. Redmond, Judge Ducks for Cover, San Francisco Bay Guardian, Dec. 17, 1986,
at 12, col. 3; conversation with Steve Kruis, Esq., of Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, Attor-
neys for the Defendants (Jan. 27, 1987).
According to the judge, "there [was] an overwhelming question of fact" as to what
constituted a newspaper. Redmond, Judge Ducks for Cover, San Francisco Bay
Guardian, Dec. 17, 1986, at 12, col. 2. However, what constitutes a newspaper for pur-
poses of section 48a is a question of law. Montandon v. Triangle Publications, 45 Cal.
App. 3d 938, 953, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 195 (1975). Only questions as to The Reader's
internal procedures, such as the length of its lead times, would have been appropriate
questions of fact under Montandon; those issues, however, were never in dispute.
Conversation with Steve Kruis, Esq., of Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, Attorneys for the
Defendants (Jan. 27, 1987).
Defendants' subsequent motion for summary adjudication, on the grounds of privi-
lege for fair comment on a judicial proceeding, was also denied. Conversation with
Steve Kruis (Feb. 9, 1988).
172. Conversation with Steve Kruis, Esq., of Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, Attorneys
for the Defendants (Feb. 9, 1988).
173. The Reader was involved with the case for over four years and spent an esti-
mated $100,000 on attorney's fees without ever even going to trial. Conversation with
Paul Krueger of The Reader (Apr. 20, 1988).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
defendant might have been quite different if section 48a clearly
and broadly delineated the scope of its protection of newspa-
pers. If such were the case, The Reader's motion for summary
adjudication as to its eligibility for protection under the statute
could have been quickly granted and the chilling effect of the
ordeal minimized. 174
B. Failure to Provide Plaintiffs with an Adequate Remedy
Broadening and clarifying the scope of section 48a would not
only result in better protection of media defamation defend-
ants, but could also enable the statute to better meet the needs
of defamation plaintiffs.
Studies have shown that defamation plaintiffs do not sue
solely to obtain a formal judicial remedy, nor with the express
goal of obtaining money damages; rather, most of them sue to
correct the record.175 If a potential defendant is sufficiently
motivated to cooperate in printing a requested correction,
therefore, the threatened lawsuit might never materialize.
176
According to a 1984 study of defamation plaintiffs who sued
media defendants,'77 their primary motivation for suing was to
vindicate their reputations178 and most felt they accomplished
this simply by filing suit - whether or not they eventually
174. For a summary of materials suggesting that the risks of defamation suits are
particularly chilling for small media, see Levine, Preliminary Procedural Protection
for the Press from Jurisdiction in Distant Forums After Calder and Keeton, 1984
ARIz. ST. L. J. 459, 463 n.21. For a discussion of the time, expense, and jeopardization
of libel insurance coverage resulting from defamation suits in general, as well as its
possible chilling effect on the press, see Note, "We're Mad as Hell and We Aren't
Going to Take It Anymore" The Press Responds to Meritless Libel Suits, 20 LOYOLA
OF L.A.L. REV. 45 (1986).
175. See generally R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE
PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 78-94, 152-69 (1987); Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, Libel
Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 215,
227-28 (1985); Barron, The Search for Media Accountability, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
789, 795-96 (1985).
176. See, e.g., R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, supra note 175, at 24 (71%
of defamation plaintiffs surveyed would have been satisfied with a retraction by the
media defendant); see also Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 175, at 221-25.
177. As part of the Iowa Libel Research Project, all defamation cases against the
media decided between May 1980 and April 1984 were collected, using Media Law
Reporter and the Libel Defense Resource Center's 50-State Survey. Of the 323 cases,
164 plaintiffs (representing 50.8% of the cases selected for study) were available and
agreed to be interviewed. R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, supra note 175,
at 241-42.
178. Id. at 93, 111-12.
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WOn.7 Apparently, plaintiffs view their filing of a defamation
suit as an expression of indignance and public denial of a story's
truthfulness;s ° the suit itself, regardless of its outcome, is seen
as legitimizing their claims of falsity.'
A second factor often motivating plaintiffs is apparently a de-
sire to punish the media. 82 Many plaintiffs who would origi-
nally have been satisfied with a retraction8s3 became so
infuriated with the media's unresponsiveness that they re-
solved to sue despite their original intention not to seek mone-
tary recovery.184
From this survey it appears that, for most defamation plain-
tiffs, filing suit is more an emotional decision than one based on
a calculation of the chances of actually prevailing.8s Since
plaintiffs consider their goals - vindication of reputation, ex-
pression of public denial, punishment of the media - to be ac-
complished simply by bringing suit, they feel they have won
regardless of the outcome in court. For them, it appears, suing
is symbolic, and unrelated to a legal ruling.'"M This may explain
why so many plaintiffs continue to sue despite the extraordi-
nary success rate of defamation defendants, particularly media
defendants.8 7 Furthermore, even losing plaintiffs usually
maintain that they would sue again if they had it to do over
again. M But regardless of whether they would sue again,
plaintiffs express dissatisfaction with the system, viewing it as
indifferent to their needs.1s9
179. Id. at 73-74, 154-67.
180. Id. at 93, 111-12, 138, 161.
181. Id. at 161.
182. Id at 93-94.
183. Seventy-one percent stated they would have been satisfied with a retraction.
Id at 24.
184. Ninety percent contacted the media before suing, 88% said that the media's
response influenced their decision to sue, and 78% sued for reasons unrelated to
money damages. Id. at 25, 73-74, 94.
185. Id. at 142.
186. Id at 93-94, 111-12, 138, 161.
187. Of cases finally resolved, only 11% of defamation plaintiffs succeeded against
media defendants. Id. at 121-22. (Against non-media defendants, defamation plain-
tiffs succeeded 18% of the time. I& at 120, 122.) Another study of recent defamation
trials found that, although 83% of juries found for the plaintiff, news organizations
won over 70% of the cases which they appealed. New York Times, March 10, 1984, at
29, col. 1. Clearly, plaintiffs who sue solely to win face long odds.
188. Roughly 84% of losing plaintiffs would sue again. Id. at 162.
189. Id. at 155-56. "Plaintiffs express a clear interest in a process that is directed
straightforwardly to the truth issue, and that is directed toward correction rather
than money." Id. at 169. See also Cendali, supra note 29, at 490 (noting the failure of
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While most plaintiffs desire to clear their reputations by
ascertaining the truth or falsity of a story, defamation cases
usually address quite different issues - the existence of consti-
tutional privileges"9 and the defendant's state of mind, for ex-
ample.'"' As any determination of truth or falsity is foreclosed
by disposition of a case on constitutional grounds, litigation
rarely addresses the gravamen of a plaintiff's complaint. 92
Nevertheless, this is presently the only way for a plaintiff to
publicly respond to a perceived libel, 9 3 and plaintiffs sue for
lack of any other available course of action.'9
Although this system is the result of a conscious priority of
protecting the media, it should be noted that the media's consti-
tutional privileges may not truly provide protection. If plain-
tiffs sue regardless of whether they anticipate winning, a
defendant's privileges may protect against losing - but they
will not protect against the ordeal of the lawsuit itself. As a
modern libel litigation to meet either plaintiffs' or defendants' needs and proposing a
national "Correction Statute" as a solution).
190. Beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
United States Supreme Court has upheld a constitutional privilege for good faith criti-
cism of public officials, requiring that a public official plaintiff must demonstrate "ac-
tual malice" on the part of the defendant in order to prevail in a defamation suit.
Actual malice is defined as publication of a statement "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." R. BEZANSON, G.
CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, supra note 175, at 280.
The Court later extended this protection to all cases involving public figures or
matters of public concern. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), however, the Court held that private individuals need not prove "ac-
tual malice" to recover damages. Finally, in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Court held that only speech on matters of public concern
deserves such protection.
191. Of defamation cases between 1974 and 1984, constitutional privileges were the
most important issue in 84%, while only 16% focused primarily on the issue of truth
or falsity. R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, supra note 175, at 106.
192. Id. at 107, 184-5.
193. Id. at 94.
194. Id. at 142. Both state and federal legislation has recently been introduced in
an attempt to return the focus of libel litigation to the issues of truth and falsity. One
bill would have allowed public officials to sue for a declaratory judgment that they
had been portrayed in a false and defamatory manner. No showing of malice was re-
quired, but neither would damages have been recoverable. A winning plaintiff could,
however, have received attorney's fees. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). An-
other bill, introduced in California, would have freed media from paying even a plain-
tiff's costs if it either could establish that it had made a reasonable effort to verify
what was published or published a correction or retraction within ten days after the
judgment. S.B. 1979, 1985-86 Regular Session. See Eberhard, There's Got to be a Better
Way. Alternatives to the High Cost of Libel, 38 MERCER L. REV. 819, 822-25 (1987).
RETRACTION STATUTE
result, while our system may protect the media against the chil-
ling impact of liability, it fails to protect against the chilling
impact of undergoing a lawsuit.195
V
Proposal
What is needed is a system which better serves the needs of
defamation plaintiffs without diminishing the media's present
constitutional protections.' While a retraction statute such as
section 48a does not provide a perfect or comprehensive solu-
tion, broad application of such a statute appears to be a step in
the right direction.
Retraction statutes like section 48a encourage the dissemina-
tor of an allegedly libelous publication to retroactively examine
the publication's truth or falsity. If on reexamination the story
is discovered to be false, a retraction statute provides the pub-
lisher with an incentive to publish an appropriate correction.
Where no retraction statute applies, however, a publisher has
no such motivation; in fact, if the case goes to trial, a retraction
could, if presented as evidence of falsity, actually increase a me-
dia defendant's liability.
Retraction statutes, then, prompt the media to react to a
complainant's allegations of falsity and to itself examine the
truthfulness of its stories. As a result, plaintiffs who would
otherwise be prompted to sue by the media's failure to react
may instead be satisfied by a resolution short of litigation, par-
ticularly since their desire for a determination of truth or fal-
sity is at least preliminarily addressed by the media itself.
In addition, publication of an adequate retraction will shield
a protected media defendant as a matter of law;19 7 the chances
of avoiding a trial altogether are thereby increased. Retraction
statutes therefore not only increase the likelihood that a de-
famation plaintiff's concerns will be addressed, but also po-
tentially provide the media defendant with protection not
effectively provided even by constitutional privileges.
As many other states have already concluded, the rationale
195. Id. at 194-95.
196. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. While a retraction statute may
preclude a plaintiff from claiming punitive or general damages, he may of course al-
lege special damages in any case, provided he has suffered actual economic harm. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1988); C. MoIs & R. MoRRIs, supra note 237, at 381.
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of encouraging speedy dissemination of the news""8 today ap-
plies as properly to magazines and other periodicals as it does to
the traditional daily newspaper.' Including California, thirty-
three states have promulgated defamation retraction stat-
utes,' with ten of these specifically applying only to newspa-
pers.2 1 The majority of retraction statutes apply to a broad
combination of "newspapers," "magazines," and "periodi-
cals, 20 2  while some decline to specify any limitation
198. See supra notes 90-131 and accompanying text.
199. For a historical view of state retraction statutes, see C. ANGOFF, HANDBOOK OF
LIBEI: A PRACTICAL GuDE FOR AUTHORS 30-245 (rev. ed. 1966); P. WITTENBERG, DAN.
GEROUS WORDS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW OF LIBEL 170-76 (1947); Harum, Remolding ofCommon Law Defamation, 49 A.B.A. J. 149, 150-51 (1963); Morris, Inadvertent News-
paper Libel & Retraction, 32 ILL. L. REV. 36, 41-43 (1937).
200. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-184 to -186, 6-5-188 to -189 (1987); ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 12-53.01 to .05 (1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-237 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 770.01 to .02, 836.07 to .08 (West 1988); GA.
CODE ANN. § 105-720 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 6-712 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-14-1,
34-4-14-2, 34-4-15-1, 34-4-15-2 (Burns 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 659.2 to .4 (West 1987);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.051, 411.061 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 153 (1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 93 (Law. Co-op. 1987); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 1988);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-1-5 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-818 to -821 (1987); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-840.01 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.331 to .338 (Michie 1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 1987); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 99-1 to -3 (1987); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02-08 (1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.03, 2739.11, 2739.13 to .16 (Bald-
win 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1446a & b (West 1988); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 30.155 to .75 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-11-7 to -8 (1987); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-24-103 (1987); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.003 (Vernon 1988);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-1, 45-1.5 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-46, 8.01-48 (1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.58.040 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (1987); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 895.05 (West 1987); WYo. STAT. § 1-29-105 (1987).
See B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGA-
TION 663-700 (Supp. 1987).
201. The retraction statutes of California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah apply only to "newspa-
pers." See supra note 200.
202. Arizona ("newspaper or magazine"), Florida ("newspaper, periodical, or other
medium"), Georgia ("newspaper or other publication"), Iowa ("newspaper, free news-
paper or shopping guide"), Montana ("newspaper, magazine [or] periodical"), New
Jersey ("newspaper, magazine, periodical, serial or other publication"), North Caro-
lina ("newspaper or periodical"), Ohio ("newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
sold or offered for sale"), Oklahoma ("newspaper or periodical"), Oregon ("newspa-
per, magazine [or) other printed periodical"), Tennessee ("newspaper or periodical"),
Virginia ("newspaper, magazine or periodical"), Washington (book, newspaper or se-
rial"), and Wisconsin ("newspaper, magazine or periodical"). See supra note 200.
Of the statutes which limit protection to particular media, only two define the
terms used. Arizona defines "magazine" or "newspaper" to mean "any publication
which may be mailed at the second-class rates established by the United States post
office," and Oklahoma defines "newspapers" and "periodicals" in the same way.
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whatsoever. °
In the wake of Kronemyer, two different amendments to
section 48a were in fact introduced in the California Legisla-
ture by Assembly Member Stirling of San Diego. 2N The first
draft of the bill amended section 48a to include coverage of
"magazines," although without defining the term.m When this
failed to gain sufficient support, a second amendment, defining
the term "newspaper" but without extending the statute's cov-
erage, was proposed." This amendment was withdrawn pend-
ing a resolution of Kronemyer, but there are no immediate
plans to reintroduce either amendment.?
In order to benefit as many defamation plaintiffs and defend-
ants as possible - thereby serving public policy and also fulfil-
ling what courts have found to be its original broad legislative
intent 2o - section 48a should be amended so as to eliminate
the distinction between "newspapers" per se and other print
media. Clearly, the two factors most critical to the effective-
ness of a retraction are speedy dissemination and dissemination
to the same forum as received the original publication. Accord-
ingly, the only prerequisite for section 48a protection should be
that a publication routinely be published at least weekly, and to
a regular audience. Because of the diminished effectiveness of
any retraction not published fairly soon after the original de-
famatory story, the present requirement that a valid retraction
be published within three weeks209 should be retained.
Conclusion
In originally declaring section 48a constitutional in Werner v.
Southern California Associated Newspapers,21 ° the intent of
the legislature, as the California Supreme Court viewed it, was
that "newspaper" be interpreted broadly so as to further the
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-653.01(4) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1446b (West
1988).
203. Alabama, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See supra note 200.
204. A.B. 163, 1987-88 Regular Session.
205. id. (amended April 6, 1987).
206. Id (amended May 19, 1987).
207. Conversation with Assembly Member Larry Stirling's office (Feb. 10, 1988).
208. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
209. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(3) (West 1988).
210. 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950).
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"public interest in the free dissemination of news. "211
Clearly, the public interest in the free dissemination of news
is not limited to news published by a narrow category of "news-
papers." So long as a publication is frequently and regularly
distributed and has a reasonably consistent circulation, its ex-
clusion from section 48a coverage is arbitrary and without
sound basis. As has been noted by the California Supreme
Court, "[t]he Legislature enacted Civil Code Section 48a to en-
courage a more active press"2 12 - not to encourage a more ac-
tive daily press which subscribes to wire services; 2 13 the statute
was enacted in light of "the public interest in the free dissemi-
nation of news"214 - not in light of the public interest in the
free dissemination of daily news.
In contrast, the narrow "newspaper" criteria suggested in
Burnett215 creates a second-class category of media in Califor-
nia - media which most of us would consider newspapers.
Publications apparently unprotected by section 48a tend to be
non-dailies; those not subscribing to AP or UPI news services,
i.e. local papers; and publications with longer lead times, 216
which may be a function of how often the publication is issued,
or of the content of material being published, but which could
also depend on the sophistication of printing technology
available.
In addition to the stigma of an implication that their content
merits less protection than does that of apparently more "wor-
thy" media, these publications suffer increased financial bur-
dens in defending against defamation suits. Not only are they
forced to bear the expense of unlimited liability in each defa-
mation suit, but they also attract more defamation suits because
of their potentially greater liability.
Timely media retractions, which are encouraged by statutes
such as section 48a, serve two purposes: they often forestall ex-
pensive and time-consuming litigation, and they restore a dam-
211. Id at 126, 216 P.2d at 828. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
212. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 459 P.2d 912, 917, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365
(1969) (emphasis added).
213. This was addressed as a possible criterion by the court in Burnett, 144 Cal.
App. 3d at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210, as well as by the plaintiff in Kronemyer. De-
fendants' Memorandum in Rebuttal, supra note 156, at 9-10.
214. Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d at 126, 216 P.2d at 828
(emphasis added). See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 89-131.
216. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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aged reputation more effectively than would delayed judicial
vindication. 17
Expansion of the shield of section 48a would not only grant
these publications the protection they merit, but would also
correspondingly expand its protection of plaintiffs. Judicial
decisions in defamation cases rarely reflect a fair or complete
determination of either the truth or the reputational harm suf-
fered. As a result, rather than rely on the actual judicial deci-
sion and the ultimate verdict, defamation plaintiffs tend to view
the suit itself as a form of vindication and an opportunity to air
their side of the story.
By rewarding potential media defendants for publishing ade-
quate and timely retractions of defamatory material, section
48a affords defamed individuals an efficient, effective and in-
expensive remedy. As a result, expensive and protracted litiga-
tion may often be avoided. It follows that the broader the
category of media covered by section 48a, the greater the
number of potential defamation plaintiffs who, satisfied with a
retraction, may not pursue litigation at all.
Section 48a protects eligible media from paying a high price
for arguably unavoidable mistakes and, concomitantly, encour-
ages prompt retractions of defamatory publications. If permit-
ted to do so, section 48a will serve these purposes more com-
prehensively than it does now, thereby sparing more plaintiffs
and defendants the expense, hostility and wasted resources in-
herent in a protracted defamation suit.
Section 48a should accordingly be amended to explicitly ex-
tend coverage to all weekly publications. In granting such pro-
tection, section 48a would better promote efficient and effective
remedies for injury and encourage investigation of the truth.
217. See Morris, supra note 199, at 38 ("[A] retraction often will do more to clear a
man's name than the 'quiet entry of a judgment on the musty rolls of a court.' ").
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